The Bitter End

Editor's note: Today, we're wrapping up our weeklong series on the corporate-bond market.

In the final Digest of the series, Porter reviews the most important rules for making big, safe returns in bonds. He also does something he has never done before: He shares five reasons why you absolutely should not subscribe to our distressed-bond service, Stansberry's Credit Opportunities.

And be sure to read to the end of today's Digest for a brand-new essay from bestselling author and Stansberry Research contributing editor P.J. O'Rourke...

The Bitter End

Still with us? Still reading? You deserve a medal!

Over the last five days, we've published more than 20,000 words about the most boring subject on Earth. It's hard to believe we have any subscribers left...

Let me apologize for torturing you with an unrelenting discussion of corporate bonds. I did it because I genuinely believe that a diversified portfolio of corporate bonds offers the best attainable investment performance for most people.

Most people have a hard time making money with stocks. Most people have a hard time losing money in bonds. As a result, most investors would be better off if they only invested in bonds and never bought stocks. That's a hell of a thing for an investment newsletter writer/publisher to say, but it's true on average.

If you've always had trouble making money with your stock portfolio – or if you would simply prefer a safer and less volatile investment strategy, try allocating more capital to corporate bonds.

When you buy bonds...

1. You know exactly how much you will make and when you will be paid.
2. Your rights are guaranteed by law. The company cannot refuse to pay you your coupons or your principal. If it can't pay you, shareholders get wiped out and the company goes bankrupt.
3. You get a binary outcome. Bonds are like a pass/fail test in school. You don't need to know everything about a business to successfully evaluate a bond... you just have to know that it has enough money to pay you.
4. It's awfully hard for the management team to screw you. Management can do lots of stupid things, almost all of which are bad for shareholders (sell assets, sell more equity, sell more bonds), but your returns will not decrease.

And then there's the credit cycle...

There are routine cycles in the corporate-bond market. Just like Joseph warned the Pharaoh, credit-growth cycles (years of plenty) tend to last between six and eight years. These are periods of strong bond issuance, when it's easy for companies to borrow and refinance their debts.

Just as night follows day, these periods are always followed by periods of rising defaults (famine). These default cycles typically last two to four years and feature sharply higher interest rates and much lower prices for corporate bonds.

Credit has been growing strongly for six years now and has only recently begun to tighten. The default rate suddenly doubled, and credit is getting significantly more expensive for the first time since 2008. It seems likely that we are on the verge of a new default cycle, during which great opportunities will emerge in corporate bonds.

One of the main drivers of these opportunities will be large institutional investors, like mutual funds, which can be forced to sell because of investor redemptions. Institutions are generally not allowed to buy noninvestment-grade debt, and many are not allowed to even own it. As a result, when investment-grade corporate debt is downgraded, there can be incredible inefficiencies in the market... Everyone is selling, but no one is buying.

Because the amount of credit growth over the last cycle has been so huge, and the general leverage in the financial system is so high, there are sure to be some huge "fireworks" as this cycle progresses. I fully expect to make dozens of unbelievable recommendations in the corporate-bond market over the next 36 months. When I say unbelievable, I mean it. You will not believe the opportunities we will find.

I recall in February 2009, Steve Sjuggerud showed me a PIMCO leveraged bond fund that was trading at half of its net asset value. If the fund merely liquidated, we would double our money. It was yielding more than 20% at the time, and I couldn't imagine a scenario where we could lose money. These are the kind of nutty things that happen at the bottom of a credit cycle. I hope you'll join me in putting some capital aside and doing some homework now so that we're ready as the cycle progresses.

Let me remind you about what I believe is the greatest advantage over stocks that bonds offer investors...

It isn't true that as the price of a stock declines, it becomes less risky. Value investors love to sing that song, but it's a lie. Most stocks that dip below $10, for example, never go back above that price. Share prices fall as a company's prospects decline, or as their balance sheet becomes encumbered. Often, the problems get worse as the stock goes lower. Thus, a falling stock price is normally a harbinger of trouble and more risk. If you've ever bought a stock that looked "cheap" and then got a lot cheaper, you know what I mean.

Bonds, however, are binary. The intrinsic value of a bond doesn't change, regardless of if the company is doing well or poorly. The security of a bond lies in its underlying collateral, not in the performance of the company. Therefore, a bond that's trading at $25 can be genuinely less risky than a bond trading at, say, $75. Yes, the $25 bond is more likely to default, but that isn't the same thing as saying it's riskier.

In fact, one of the most striking facts we've discovered about bonds during our research is that noninvestment-grade bonds and investment-grade bonds have had almost exactly the same recovery rates over the last 30 years – around $0.40 on the dollar. While I would not expect recoveries to be that good during the next default cycle, when we recommend bonds we will always evaluate the collateral so that we know what we are actually risking in a worst-case scenario. With stocks, you're always risking 100%.

I believe discounted corporate bonds offer investors an unbeatable combination of high returns and safety. With these bonds, you have the opportunity to make capital gains that are better than the average returns in stocks, while also earning high rates of current yield. Plus, you can make these returns with securities that are far safer than stocks.

There are, of course, huge caveats to this advice.

I've tried to explain most of the pitfalls over the last five days. The biggest and most important caveat is that, unlike stocks, bonds are binary. They will either pay you in full and on time or they won't. That's great because you don't have to worry about whether the company is doing well, you just have to make sure that it can pay you. This creates a different kind of market dynamic where, if doubts about a company's ability to service its bondholders emerge, it can become difficult (or even impossible) to sell.

The only way to deal with this kind of binary, do-or-die asset is to diversify your portfolio. If you're not able or willing to diversify your corporate-bond portfolio – that means buying at least 10 different bonds across the risk spectrum – the chances of you losing money are 50/50.

On the other hand, if you diversify and wait until these bonds are trading at a substantial discount to par, there is almost no chance you will lose money if you're able to hold the bonds until maturity.

The other major caveat is that bonds can be difficult to buy and sell. Unlike stocks, there isn't a constant bid and ask in every corporate bond. When you want to buy, you usually have to pay a much higher price than you could get if you wanted to sell.

This "spread" makes trading bonds a bad idea for most individuals. That means when you buy a bond, you have to be prepared to hold it. It also means trading techniques that you might use to manage risk will be much less effective. That's another reason diversification is so important.

I've spent a lot of time and money over the last 12 months building a huge analytical engine that can analyze all U.S. corporate bonds. Our system is designed to find the "needle in the haystack" – bonds at various levels of risk that we believe are mispriced relative to their chance of default.

I'm confident that with this new tool and my team of analysts, we can outperform the work we did during the last default cycle, when interest rates on these kinds of corporate bonds peaked in the mid-20% range. This is going to be a fantastic time to be a bond investor. And we've built the tools you need to make careful, diligent choices. I wouldn't buy bonds without looking at our work first.

Yes, we will be making specific recommendations – probably one per month. But far more important, we're also going to give you a fair amount of data on the market and individual bonds that our computer models have told us are attractive. This will help you time the default cycle and give you dozens of possible bond investments in addition to our formal recommendations.

But let me say this: I firmly believe our new Stansberry's Credit Opportunities advisory will be the most successful and safest advisory we have ever published.

Sure, it's easy for me to say that. But look at the performance of the bonds we recommended during the last crisis... we didn't lose money on any of the distressed bonds we recommended, from Lehman's default through the end of 2010, and one of those bonds made returns in excess of 700%.

This coming default cycle will be worse, and the tools we now have to pick safe bonds are far better and more sophisticated than what we had last time. I have heard from hundreds of you that wished you had paid more attention to our last bond newsletter. Well, this is it. This is opportunity knocking. Don't fumble the ball this time.

Here's the irony: Even if I'm right about the future performance of this product – even if it's the most successful advisory we ever publish – it will also generate more subscriber anger and dissatisfaction than any of our other publications.

Why? Because buying bonds is not like buying stocks. You will probably have to use the phone. Some brokers will not allow you to buy noninvestment-grade bonds. Some brokers will not help you find the bonds you want to buy. That's why I strongly suggest you call your broker and discuss your plans to buy distressed bonds during the next 12 to 36 months. Find out if your broker is willing to work with you and, if he isn't, find one who will. It's not that hard.

You can do it. And it could be worth a fortune if you just try. According to many subscribers, Interactive Brokers is easy to work with and is prepared to help you purchase individual bonds. I personally have used TD Ameritrade to buy deeply distressed debt. It's not impossible to buy corporate bonds. It just might feel that way the first time you try. Persevere.

Here's something you've never seen me do before: There are a lot of reasons you shouldn't subscribe to my new bond letter. I want to make sure you understand why it's probably not right for you...

  • Please do not subscribe to our new bond service if you're afraid of using the phone or if you can't be bothered to search for a good bond broker who will work with you. Remember, we cannot recommend a broker. We cannot place your trades. We cannot give you any personal advice whatsoever.
  • Do not subscribe if you can't manage dealing with nine-digit CUSIP symbols that are made up of both numbers and letters. (Oh, the horror!) This is how bonds are identified. You will have to use them every time you buy or sell a bond. You will see them every time you get your account statements. And you will see them constantly in our research.
  • Do not subscribe if you're not aware that there can be little liquidity in the bond market. When we make a recommendation, our subscribers who buy will cause the availability of those bonds to decrease, at least temporarily. That doesn't mean you will never be able to get the bonds you want, it just means you have to be patient. You might have to consider buying a slightly different bond (from the same issuer). It's no big deal, as our ratings are based on the issuer. But if you can't handle being flexible given the liquidity constraints of this market, do not subscribe to this advisory.
  • Do not subscribe if you're only going to buy the riskiest bonds we recommend or if you're not willing to diversify your portfolio. Please, please, please do not do this. It will make me pull out my hair when you send me a note blaming me for your losses.
  • Finally, do not subscribe if you're poor. I'm not being rude. I'm serious. Bonds are great for people who are already rich. They're not that great for people who are poor, as most of the returns from bonds come from coupons (yields). To earn good amounts of income, you have to have a lot of capital. That's just a fact, and it's not my fault. When asked about the poor, Ayn Rand said "Don't be one of them." I subscribe to the same theory. Go make money. When you have some, subscribe to our bond research. But please don't badger me about not doing enough to help people: I just wrote more than 20,000 words about bonds, for Pete's sake. And I didn't charge you anything to read them.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Editor's note: If you're interested in profiting – rather than panicking – during the coming credit-default crisis, there is no better guide than Stansberry's Credit Opportunities. And if you've ever considered trying Stansberry's Credit Opportunities, there will never be a better time than right now...

As regular readers know, Porter and his team just shared a brand-new update with Stansberry's Credit Opportunities subscribers. They believe the next massive opportunity in bonds is about to begin this fall... and the last time conditions were this good, subscribers were able to earn total returns of as much as 770%, while taking less risk than buying stocks.

That's impressive... But Porter and his team believe the opportunities in the coming crisis could be even better. And until the end of August, you can sign up for 60% off the regular cost of this service.

But if you're interested, please hurry... We'll likely never be able to offer Stansberry's Credit Opportunities at this price again. Click here to join now. (This does not lead to a long promotional video.)

The Strange, Shape-Shifting Symbol of Value: Teaching Myself Economics, Part IV

In today's column, I'll write about the economic concept that's truly most difficult to grasp: money.

For the past three columns, I've been writing on the subject of how I went about getting self-educated in economics (here, here, and here). I had to trust my instincts and my eyes to see beyond basic textbook economics and learn anything important. But there was a little more to economics than just common sense and experience. In my last column, I wrote about Ricardo's law of comparative advantage, which required a little bit of arithmetic.

So today... money. The concept is so hard to comprehend, it's not just me who's confused. All the world's top economists, central bankers, and powerful politicians are failing this part of the course.

Why is this soiled, crumpled, over-decorated piece of paper bearing a picture of a man who was something of a failure as a president worth $50? Meanwhile, why is this clean, soft, white, and cleverly folded piece of paper worth so little that I just blew my nose on it?

And what exactly is a "dollar"? If it's a thing that I want, why do I prefer to have 50 grimy old dollars instead of one nice new one? This isn't true of other things – like puppies, for instance.

Of course, money is not a puppy. Money is not a specific thing. Money is a symbol of things in general, a symbol of how much you want things, and a symbol of how many things you're going to get. Money is an abstract representation of value.

But what is value? The brief answer is "it's complicated." Value varies according to time, place, circumstance, and whether the puppy ruined the rug.

Plus, some things are difficult to place a value on. This is why we don't use money to measure all of our exchanges. Kids get food, clothing, and shelter from parents. And in return, parents get... kids.

Important emotional, moral, and legal distinctions are made between sex and paying for sex, even if the socially approved kind of sex costs dinner and a movie.

We need economic goods all the time, but we don't always need money for them. And that's a good thing, since for most of human existence, there wasn't any money at all.

In ancient times, money didn't exist. Or rather, everything that existed was money. If I sold you a cow for six goats, you were charging it on your Goat Card.

Anything that's used to measure value, if it has value itself, is "commodity money." Societies that didn't have dollar bills picked one or two commodities as proto-greenbacks.

The Aztecs used cocoa beans for money, North Africans used salt (the origin of the word "salary"), and medieval Norwegians used butter and dried cod. (Their ATMs were a mess.)

Some commodities work better as money than others. Movie stars would make bad money. Carrying a couple around would be a bother, and you would have to hack a leg off to make change.

Precious metals, however, make good money and have been used that way for more than 5,000 years.

Metal commodity money is portioned out by weight. A commodity money coin is just a hunk of precious metal stamped to indicate how much it weighs.

Moving from weighing money to stamping coins is a simple step, but a couple thousand years passed before the step was taken. Nobody trusted anybody else to do the stamping.

When coins were invented, the distrust proved to be well-founded. The first Western coins were minted by the kingdom of Lydia, in what is now Turkey. They were made of a gold-silver alloy called electrum.

It's hard for anyone but a chemist (and there weren't any) to tell how much gold is in a piece of electrum versus how much silver. The king of Lydia, Croesus, became proverbial for his wealth.

In China, the weight of bronze "cash" was supposed to be guaranteed by death penalties. A lot of people must have gone to the electric chair (or would have if they had electricity).

A horse cost 4,500 "one cash" coins during the Han dynasty (206 B.C to 220 A.D.) and 25,000 cash during the Tang dynasty (618 A.D. to 907).

It's very hard for the people who issue cash to resist the temptation to debase that cash.

Kings, emperors, and even lowly congressional representatives have expenses. It is to a government's advantage to pay for those expenses with funny money.

One reason that the concept of money so often violates common sense is that governments so often do crazy things with money.

Another reason that money violates common sense is that we don't have to use real commodities as money. We can use pieces of paper promising to deliver those real commodities. This is "fiduciary money," from the Latin word fiducia, meaning trust.

In Europe, paper money was developed privately, in the 13th century, from bills of exchange traded among Italian merchants and from receipts given by goldsmiths to whom precious metals had been entrusted for safekeeping.

Public fiduciary money was first printed in Sweden. Swedish commodity money came in the form of copper plates. Thus, in Sweden, a large fortune was a large fortune.

In 1656, the Stockholms Banco began issuing more convenient paper notes. The bank issued too many notes, and the Swedish government went broke.

In 1716, Scotsman John Law helped the French government establish the Banque Royale, issuing notes backed by the value of France's land holdings west of the Mississippi. Banque Royale issued too many notes, and the French government went broke.

The largest Western experiment with fiduciary money took place right here in America. In 1775, the Second Continental Congress not only created paper money, but passed a law against refusing to accept it. The Continental Congress issued too many notes and... a pattern begins to emerge.

All fiduciary money is backed by a commodity, even if the backers are lying about the amount of that commodity.

Historically, the commodity most often chosen has been gold. By the 19th century, the major currencies of the world were based on gold, led by the most major currency among them, the British pound.

This was a period of monetary stability and, not coincidentally, economic growth. Some people think we should go back on the gold standard, and not all of them have skinny sideburns, large belt buckles, and live on armed compounds in Idaho. Money ought to be worth something, and gold seems as good as whatever.

But the relationship between money and value is endlessly perplexing. The high value of gold is a social convention, a habit left over from the days when bright, unblemished things (people included) were rare.

Gold may go out of fashion. I don't think this is likely, but a generation may come along that regards gold as gross or immoral, the way current 20-year-olds regard veal.

And gold is a product. We may discover different methods to get huge new amounts of it.

This happened to the Spanish. When they conquered the New World, they obtained tons of gold, melted it down, and sent it to the mint. It never occurred to them that they were just creating more money, not more things to spend it on. Between 1500 and 1600, prices in Spain went up 400%.

Presented with the vast wealth of America's oceans, fields, and forests, Spain took the gold. It was as if someone robbed a bank and stole nothing but deposit slips.

Gold is not an absolutely, perfectly rational basis for a currency. But the real problem with fiduciary money – from a government standpoint – is that it's inconvenient.

A currency that can be converted into a commodity limits the amount of currency that can be printed. A government has to have at least some of the commodity or the world makes a laughingstock out of its banknotes – "not worth a Continental."

So if a government can lie about the amount of a commodity that is backing its currency – the way the Stockholms Banco, Banque Royale, and Second Continental Congress did – why can't a government lie about everything?

Instead of passing a law saying one dollar equals X amount of gold, why not pass a law saying one dollar equals one dollar? This is "fiat money," from the Latin word for "a binding edict." And fiat money is almost the only kind of national currency left in the world.

Fiat money is backed by nothing but faith that a government won't keep printing money until we're using it in place of something more important, such as Kleenex.

Concerning this faith, the experiences of Weimar's Germany, Carter's America, Yeltsin's Russia, etc., make agnostics of us all.

The only thing that protects us from completely worthless money is our ability to buy and sell. We can move our stock of wealth from the imaginary value of dollars to the fictitious value of euros to the mythical value of stock shares to the illusory value of real estate, and so forth.

Our freedom to not use a particular kind of money keeps the issuers of that money – honest wouldn't be the word – somewhat moderate in their dishonesty... or it used to.

I emerged from teaching myself economics with two final lessons. Money is a symbol of value, but it's a symbol that's strange, shape-shifting, and hard to define. And value is something that's personal and relative, and changes from moment to moment.

Money can't always be valued. And value can't always be priced.

Regards,

P.J. O'Rourke

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